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THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING: A COMMON GROUND FOR THE
TORTS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM
EMPLOYMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years, the California Sup:reme Court
has led efforts to ameliorate the inequitable effects of the in-
creasing economic concentration in our industrialized society.1
The court has sought to adjust gross disparities in bargaining
power by using the flexibility of the common law to fashion
remedies that are openly based on an assessment of the social
and economic realities of the relationship or "status" of the
parties.2 In this manner, the California Supreme Court and
other state courts concerned with changing social relation-
ships have adjusted unequal power in the relationships be-
tween workers and unions, 8 doctors and professional socie-
ties,4  insurers and insureds,5  patients and hospitals,"
© 1981 by Tom May
1. See generally J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); Tobriner &
Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial
State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247 (1967).
2. For discussion of the role of status concepts in the recent development of the
law, see generally Rintala, The Supreme Court of California, 1968-1969, Foreword:
"Status" Concepts in the Law of Torts, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 80 (1970); Tobriner, Retro-
spect: Ten Years on the California Supreme Court, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 5 (1972);
Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 1.
3. See Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 42, 409
P.2d 934, 48 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1966); Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical
Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958); James v. Marinship Corp., 35
Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
4. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 1, at 1258-60 (discussing Blende v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964) and Falcone v. Middlesex
County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961)). See also Pinsker v. Pacific
Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974);
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 475, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1969).
5. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970).
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depositors and banks,7 and consumers and producers.' In each
area, the court has pierced the veil of "arms-length bargain-
ing" implicit in traditional contract doctrine and has often
imposed a tort measure of damages to deter abuse by the
stronger party in what would otherwise be treated as a con-
tractual relationship. This comment suggests that a similar
approach should be given to the employee/employer relation-
ships by judicial infusion of content into the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing that is implied by law in every contract,
including contracts of employment.10
The twentieth century has witnessed a growing imbalance
of the economic power between the employer and employee.
Although the labor union movement attempted to redress the
imbalance, 1 its impact has shrunk along with its dwindling
representation of the labor force. 2 In the meantime, increased
6. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
7. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 1, at 1276-78 (discussing Los Angeles Inv. Co.
v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919) and
Frankini v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n., 12 Cal. App. 2d 298, 55 P.2d
232 (1936)).
8. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 1, at 1278-82 (discussing Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)). See also
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969). For an excellent discussion of the evolution of legal concepts dealing with
these relationship and an analysis of some of the cases cited in notes 3-8 supra, see
Goodman & Seaton.
9. Several writers have suggested that the employment relation is best analyzed
in terms of status rather than contract. See Kahn-Freund, Blackstone's Neglected
Child: The Contract of Employment, 93 LAW Q. REV. 508 (1977); McCaughey, Nature
of the Relationship of Employee-Employer: Contract or Status? 56 CAN. B. REV. 497
(1978); Smith, Is Employment Properly Analyzed in Terms of a Contract?, 6 N.Z.U.
L. REV. 341 (1975).
10 See Foley v. United States Paving Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 499, 505, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 780, 784 (1968) (citing Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 177 P.2d 931 (1947)
and Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958));
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455 (1980).
11. See, e.g., American Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257
U.S. 184, 209 (1921) (Taft, C.J.):
[A] single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was
dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself
and family. If the employer refused to pay him the wages that he
thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to re-
sist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers
opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.
12. Big Labor Strives to Break Out of Its Rut, FORTUNE, Aug. 27, 1979, at 37.
Statistics compiled in this article indicate a decline in union representation from ap-
proximately 25% of the labor force in 1955 to approximately 20% in mid-1979.
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occupational immobility,"3 compounded by limited reemploy-
ment opportunities due to technological specialization" and
the shrinking opportunities for self-employment due to con-
centration of economic power," has created a socio-economic
environment which prompted one writer to observe:
We have become a nation of employees. We are depen-
dent upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of
our people have become completely dependent upon
wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource ex-
cept for the relief supplied by the various forms of social
security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon
others for all of their income is something new in the
world. For our generation, the substance of life is in an-
other man's hands. 6
In contrast to the employee's dependence on the employ-
ment relation, the employer is relatively unconcerned with the
identity of the person with whom he shares the relation. The
employer's interest is merely to have some-
one-anyone-occupy a predesigned job role and perform the
functions assigned to it. Even where the specific identity of
the employee is important, or where the availability of em-
ployees with the requisite skills is limited, the employer has
recourse to market mechanisms that permit increased labor
costs to be shifted to third party consumers. Thus, employees
can expect little protection of their interests in the continued
employment relation through the operation of employer self-
interest. To the contrary, the employer's relative disinterest
works a profound harm to employees by operation of the rule
that an employment contract for an indefinite period may be
terminated at any time at the will of either party. In the clas-
sic statement of the rule, an employer may discharge an em-
ployee "for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally
13. J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 114 (2d ed. 1956).
14. See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 n.9 (1967). The
author offers as an example B.F. Goodrich v. Wohlgumuth, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 805
(Ohio App. 1963), where the employee, having learned trade secrets while working for
Goodrich as a space suit expert, was enjoined from working for one of the few other
companies in the space suit field.
15. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EMPLOYMENT SITU-
ATION: JULY 1978 (1978).
16. F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis in original).
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wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong. ' 17 The
employee's interests are hardly vindicated by dogged insis-
tence that he may quit his job for equally capricious reasons."8
The rule has been justly criticized as a species of that law
which permits rich and poor alike to sleep beneath bridges."
As might be expected the at-will rule has resulted in judi-
cial sanction of the most egregious employer behavior.2 Al-
17. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). See Blum-
rosen, Worker's Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis-a Judge for
Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 480, 481 (1970); Weyand, Present Status of Individ-
ual Employee Rights, N.Y.U. 22ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171, 175 (1970);
Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 107
(1942). See also 1 C. LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT § 183 (2d ed. 1904).
18. For further discussion of the misapplication of mutuality concepts to the
employment relation, see text accompanying notes 61-72 infra. Professor Blades has
noted the irony of using the mutuality rule in defense of abusive exercise of employer
power where the origins of the rule can be traced to concerns for employee freedom.
Blades, supra note 14, at 1419 (citing Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174
La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932)):
An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently,
thereby cutting himself off from all chances of improving his condition;
indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public policy and
the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself;
and the law will presume . . . that he did not so intend. And if the
contract of employment be not binding on the employee for the whole
term of such employment, then it cannot be binding upon the employer;
there would be a lack of 'mutuality.'
The fallacy of this legal logic lies in an unstated correlative presumption: public pol-
icy and the spirit of our institutions lead the law to presume that the employee in-
tended to subject himself to arbitrary dismissal. This presumption has as little foun-
dation in the reality of the employment relation as it has in the modern legal
conception of mutuality. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERRILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4-
14 (2d ed. 1977).
19. Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship:
An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV. 457, 461 (1979) (citing ANATOLE
FRANCE, L'AFFAIRE CRAINQUEBILLE (1901)).
20. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976) (employee
mechanical engineer fired because of refusal to falsify reports submitted to govern-
ment agency); Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (employer need
not return contributions to pension fund made by employee who was fired without
cause after 43 years of service); Comerford v. International Harvester Co., 235 Ala.
376, 178 So. 894 (1938) (employee fired because employer failed to alienate affections
of employee's wife); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960)
(employee fired for accepting jury duty although management had advised her to do
so); Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956) (employee fired because
he filed workman's compensation claim against his employer); Wegman v. Dairylea
Coop., Inc., 50 A.D.2d 108, 376 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1975), leave to appeal denied, 38
N.Y.2d 918, 346 N.E.2d 817, 383 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1976) (employee fired because he re-
fused to participate in illegal standardization of milk products).
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though significant groups of unionized2 1 and public employ-
ees2 2 have found shelter from the rule, the majority of
American employees 28 remain subject to its excesses. Although
some statutory24 and judicial action25 has limited the scope of
the at-will rule, the protection thus afforded is merely inci-
dental to larger statutory and public policy goals rather than
based upon an assessment of the competing interests of em-
ployer and employee. A reevaluation of the at-will rule is nec-
essary: the scope of the rule far exceeds its social utility and
shifts to the employee the burden of unproductive and unwar-
ranted employer discretion at the expense of important em-
ployee interests that deserve protection.
This comment first examines the origins of the at-will
rule, the rule's legal and policy foundations, and the em-
ployer's interest in maintaining control of the work place. It
then discusses the limited effectiveness of various judicial at-
tempts to control abuses of employer power. Finally, the com-
ment concludes that effective relief must be predicated on a
21. Unionized employees are protected from employer abuse by collective bar-
gaining agreements containing express or implied "just cause" standards for dismis-
sal. Labor arbitrators have developed a "common law" of dismissal in the course of
interpreting these just cause provisions. C. Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 499-501 (1976).
22. Public employees are protected from employer abuse by civil service laws
and regulations. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7512(a) (1976), which permits discharge only
"for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Public employees also
enjoy substantial procedural safeguards in the determination of cause for dismissal.
Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees? 124
U. PA. L. REv. 942, 945 (1976); Lowry, Constitutional Limitations on the Dismissal
of Public Employees, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1976).
23. Approximately 20% of the work force is unionized. See note 12 supra. U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS., DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR UNION AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIA-
TION MEMBERSHIP 1976 (1977). Civil servants comprised approximately 16.2% of the
work force in 1975. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF
LABOR STATISTICS 1977, table 1, at 21 & table 46, at 96 (1977). Given some overlap of
unionized and public employees, about two-thirds of American workers may safely be
said to lack any comprehensive protection from unjust discharge.
24. A variety of state and federal statutes prohibit discharge because of race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex. Principal among these is the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976)). Other statutes provide narrowly drawn protection for veterans, debtors, the
aged, and the physically handicapped, to name a few. See statutes collected in Note,
A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
1435, 1447 nn. 58-63 (1975). See also C. Summers, supra note 21, at 491-99; Note,
Non-Statutory Causes of Action for an Employer's Termination of an "At Will"
Employment Relationship: A Possible Solution to the Economic Imbalance in the
Employer-Employee Relationship, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 743, 748-49 (1979).
25. See text accompanying notes 87-119 infra.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
balancing of competing interests of employer and employee
and suggests that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing achieves that purpose and provides a common theo-
retical structure under which previous attempts to produce a
remedy can be consolidated.
II. THE AT-WILL RULE: THE SOURCE OF POTENTIALLY
ABUSIVE EMPLOYER POWER
A. Origins of the Rule
The modern employment relationship has its origins in
the English common law of master and servant. Developed
from status notions of tenure in land, the doctrine of master
and servant was heavily influenced by the nature of the ser-
vant's relationship with his feudal lord.2  Given the familial
characteristics of the relation, the law of master and servant
was regarded as a branch of the law of domestic relations
which included husband and wife, parent and child, guardian
and ward, and infancy.27 In each case, the law severely re-
stricted the ability of the parties to sever the bonds of the
relationship. When the Black Death reduced the labor force
by half, these bonds were further tightened by a series of En-
glish statutes.28 The statutes provided that no master could
discharge his servant or apprentice except on reasonable
cause.
2 9
Not until 1875, when the statutes were repealed, 0 did
contract notions prevail over the old status concepts.3 ' Status
notions of the bonds between master and servant nevertheless
continued to influence development of contract doctrine; in
the English common law the limited ability to sever the
26. F. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 26 (1967). See also Feinman,
The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976);
Harrison, Termination of Employment, 10 ALBERTA L. REV. 250, 251 (1972); Com-
ment, Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 211, 212-
14 (1973).
27. J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS: EMBRACING
HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY AND MASTER
AND SERVANT (5th ed. 1895). For an excellent discussion of the modern relationship
between domestic and employment law see Glendon & Lev, supra note 19.
28. Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, c. 1; Statute of Labourers, 1562, 5
Eliz. 1, c. 4, §§ 5, 13, 35.
29. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425-26.
30. Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 86, § 17.
31. See 1 E. LIFSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 114 (12th ed. 1959).
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master-servant relation was preserved by the presumption
that employment was for one year.2 Thus, the English em-
ployer's discretion to discharge an employee for no cause or
bad cause was curtailed by the prospect of breach of contract
damages.
In the United States, the received common law of em-
ployment was in considerable disarray by the mid-nineteenth
century. Several approaches to discharge problems were evi-
dent." Finally, in 1877, the treatise writer H.G. Wood settled
the confusion by formulating the employment at-will rule.
In England, it is held that a general hiring, or a hiring by
the terms of which no time is fixed, is a hiring by the
year .... With us, the rule is inflexible that a general or
indefinite hiring is, prima facie a hiring at will, and if the
servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is
upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a
day, week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an
indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was
for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever
time the party may serve."'
This announcement, which amounted to a rejection of prior
English law was made without analysis or justification. The
four American cases cited as authority for the rule did not
support it.-5 Despite its questionable authority, the at-will
32. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425. This rule later evolved into a rule
permitting termination only after a notice period determined by custom in the trade
or, in the absence of custom, some reasonable time unless a shorter notice period was
expressly agreed to or there was cause for summary dismissal. This English common
law rule was displaced in 1963 by statutory minimum notice standards. The Indus-
trial Relations Act of 1971 provided English workers with comprehensive protection
against unjust dismissal. For a review of protective laws in other countries, see C.
Summers, supra note 21, at 508-19. Summers concludes that "[t]he United States is
one of the few industrial countries that does not provide general legal protection
against unjust dismissals." Id. at 508.
33. Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341
n.50 (1974). One approach analyzed the circumstances surrounding the employment
relation to determine the duration of the contract. Another relied on a presumption
that the duration of the contract was equal to the pay interval.
34. H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877) (reprinted in H. WOOD,
MASTER AND SERVANT § 136 (2d ed. 1886)). See also C. LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT
§ 159 (2d ed. 1913). For a discussion of the progression of American law up to Wood's
formulation, see P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 128-37 (1969).
35. Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80
U.S. 254 (1871); DeBrian v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co.,
106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871). For an anal-
ysis of these cases demonstrating their lack of support for the at-will rule, see Note,
1981] 1117
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rule was rapidly adopted by the courts and was firmly in place
by the beginning of the twentieth century. The courts adopted
the rule with minimal legal analysis and even less concern for
the injury to employee interests caused by its application. 6
By operation of the rule, employment contracts for an indefi-
nite term became devices for creating legally unsupervised re-
lationships that effectively gave management absolute discre-
tion.37 The employer was free to use his power to discharge for
purposes that would not be tolerated if the employer had used
a different means of coercion. 8
Given this result and the benefit of hindsight, the rapid
acceptance of the at-will rule is difficult to understand. Sev-
eral commentators have suggested that the rule squared well
with the then dominant ideology of laissez-faire and its legal
analogue, freedom of contract.39 Further support was found in
the contractual principle of mutuMity of obligation: if the em-
ployee has the right to quit his job at will, then his employer
must also have the right to fire the employee for any reason,
whether good, bad, or indifferent.40 As suggested earlier, 1 the
"freedom" imported into the employment relation by the at-
will rule is hardly mutual and cannot be fairly described as
freedom of contract.' 2 The rule may perhaps be more accu-
rately described as serving the perceived economic needs of
supra note 33, at 341 n.54.
36. The leading case adopting the at-will rule is Martin v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) (no analysis of employee expectations or reli-
ance after ten years of employment). See also Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163
F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908) (200 black stevedores hired for permanent employment
discharged to accomodate white stevedores); Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 F.
246 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1903) (court sustained demurrer to a claim of conspiracy to dis-
charge employees for union activity and indicated result would be the same if em-
ployees had been discharged for being Presbyterians).
37. P. SELZNICK, supra note 34, at 131-35.
38. See cases cited notes 20 & 36 supra.
39. Blades, supra note 14, at 1416-19; Feinman, supra note 26, at 118; Note,
supra note 33, at 343.
40. Blades, supra note 14, at 1419-21; Note, supra note 33, at 346-47.
41. See note 18 supra.
42. The court in Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884) as-
serted that freedom of contract was the primary policy behind employment at-will,
but was less concerned with the employee's freedom to negotiate a bargain at arms
length than the employer's freedom to discharge employees for any reason. This so
called freedom of contract "secured all civil and industrial liberty." Id. at 520. Ac-
cord, Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908). See text accompanying notes 73-81 infra for the somewhat more accurate
description of this doctrine as freedom of enterprise.
[Vol. 211118
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capital interests during a period of industrial expansion. 43
Those interests have been described as a philosophy of free-
dom of enterprise 4 which included the "fundamental right"
of the employer to discharge employees at will.45 Whatever so-
cial utility these legal and policy justifications for the at-will
rule may have had at the beginning of the century have been
substantially eroded by the passage of time and events.
B. The Eroding Legal and Policy Foundations of the At-
Will Rule
1. Laissez-Faire and Freedom of Contract.
Nineteenth century concepts of freedom of contract pre-
sumed that parties were free to bargain in reaching agree-
ments that would impose reciprocal rights and obligations
based on mutual consent. Although the parties may have held
unequal bargaining power, each was free to give or withhold
his consent to the resulting deal, however lopsided the agree-
ment may have been. Any attempt to interfere or limit the
self-imposed rights and duties created by consent was viewed
as inimical to the basic right of individuals to form contracts
among themselves.46 Thus, it is not surprising that the em-
ployer's unrestrained right to discharge under an at-will em-
ployment contract was jealously guarded. So prevalent were
these ideas that the employer's right to discharge attained
constitutional proportions within a scant thirty years of
Wood's announcement of the at-will rule.
In Adair v. United States,47 the United States Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a federal statute that sought
to limit the employer's right to discharge because of union
membership. The Court found that any legislative interfer-
ence with the "equality of right" to consent to a contract was
an "arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract" 48 and
an unwarranted taking of a property right protected by the
43. Feinman, supra note 26, at 118. See notes and text accompanying notes 73-
81 infra.
44. Blumrosen, supra note 17, at 481; Note, supra note 33, at 343.
45. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
46. J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CEN-
TURY UNITED STATES 3-35 (1956).
47. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
48. Id. at 175.
1981] 1119
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fifth amendment."9 The Supreme Court, in effect, declared
that liberty of contract gave the employer but not the em-
ployee a property right in the employment relation.50 Seven
years later, the Court struck down similar state legislation,
thus reaffirming the employer's "inviolable right of property
and uninhibited freedom of conract." 1 The Court held that
any law that interfered with "the right of the purchaser of
labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept
such labor from a person offering to sell it" was a violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.52 The
Court dismissed concern for employee interests by suggesting
that any inequality in the bargaining process was a natural
and unavoidable by-product of the right of private property.53
The idea that contract rights were unrestrained by com-
peting interests did not last long. Under the weight of the De-
pression and the social legislation it spawned, the notion of
economic due process that was so prominant in Coppage was,
of necessity, put aside." For the employer, the ideal of com-
plete freedom of contract which supported the absolute right
to discharge had become an anachronism.55 The Supreme
Court recognized the inherent inequality of the employment
49. Id. at 176.
50. C. Summers, supra note 21, at 486.
51. Blades, supra note 14, at 1417 (discussing Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915)).
52. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. at 10.
53. Writing for the majority, Justice Pitney observed:
As to the interest of the employees, it is said by the Kansas Supreme
Court . . .to be a matter of common knowledge that 'employees, as a
rule, are not financially able to be as independent in making of contracts
for the sale of their labor as are employers in making contracts of
purchase thereof.' No doubt, wherever the right of private property ex-
ists, there must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally
happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally un-
hampered by circumstances .... [S]ince it is self-evident that, unless all
things are held in common, some persons must have more property than
others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of
contract and the right of private property without at the same time rec-
ognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the neces-
sary result of the exercise of those rights.
Id. at 17.
54. See generally Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
55. Blades, supra note 14, at 1418 ("The System of 'free' contract described by
nineteenth century theory is now coming to be recognized as a world of fantasy, too
orderly, too neatly contrived, and too harmonious to correspond with reality.") (quot-
ing Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law,
11 TUL. L. REV. 345 (1937)).
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relation and the necessity of limiting the employer's right to
discharge when it upheld the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)5 in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.5 7 The
NLRA sought to remedy employer abuse of termination prac-
tices by protecting the employee's right to unionize and
prohibiting retaliatory dismissal for union activity.58 The
Court observed that the NLRA did not interfere with the
"normal" exercise of the employer's right to discharge but was
intended only to prohibit "using the right to discharge as a
means of intimidation and coercion" against employees who
exercised their rights to organize.5 The limitation on the right
of discharge was narrowly confined to union activity, but the
lesson seemed clear: employee interests that are sufficiently
important may limit the otherwise unrestricted employer
right to discharge. Although the at-will rule had survived, any
vitality it enjoyed because of freedom of contract was lost.60
2. Mutuality of Obligation
The employer's absolute right of discharge is often justi-
fied by reference to the employee's right to quit at any time.
Unless the employer's right is equal in scope to that of his
employee, it is said that the contract would lack mutuality of
obligation. This is a legal non sequitur. Modern contract the-
ory does not require mutuality of obligation. Most authorities
agree that it has lost all utility as an analytical tool and ought
to be abandoned."' The real question is whether there is mu-
tual consideration 62 which will support reciprocal rights and
obligations. The rights and obligations supported by consider-
ation need not be equal. 3 Thus, the employee's single promise
56. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)).
57. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937);
Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
58. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, §§ 7, 8(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1976)).
59. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
60. "The course of decisions in this Court since Adair v. United States
[and] Coppage v. Kansas ... have completely sapped those cases of their authority."
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).
61. J. CALAMARI & J. PERRILLO, supra note 18; 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152
(1963) (There is "vagueness and inconsistency and error" in the use of "mutuality.");
J. MURRY, CONTRACTS § 90 (rev. ed. 1974); REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81
(Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
62. J. CALAMARI & J. PERRILLO, supra note 18 ("The supposed requirement of
mutuality of obligation is merely one of mutuality of consideration.").
63. Id. § 4-22.
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to provide services while retaining his rights to terminate at
will could support multiple promises of the employer to pay
compensation, provide benefits, and continue employment for
a definite period, or even to limit the employer's right to ter-
minate for ulterior purposes. The at-will rule, however, denies
this possibility.
In complete derogation of the modern theory of consider-
ation, the at-will rule first assumes that an employee would
not contract away his right to quit without an express state-
ment to that effect. The rule then leaps to the unwarranted
conclusion that, in the absence of such a statement, the em-
ployer's right to terminate must also be unlimited. In effect,
the at-will rule replaces analysis of the consideration passing
between the parties with a rigid set of presumptions based
upon discredited notions of mutual obligation.
The contract created by the at-will rule is as curious as
the theory on which it is based. The terminable at-will em-
ployment contract exists from moment to moment, impliedly
renewed by the simple fact that neither party has terminated
nor modified the relationship." Consideration and perform-
ance are exchanged continuously and simultaneously. Each
successive moment the relationship survives acts as a separate
executed agreement. Neither party to such a fleeting agree-
ment can have any contractually recognizable expectancy that
the employment will exist beyond the immediate moment.
Thus, there is really no breach of any executory duty when
one of the parties exercises his "right" not to form a new con-
tract. This right to terminate the relation does not flow from
contractual elements of consideration and consent supporting
prior executed agreements to exchange services, but rather
from the presumption the law imposes. These curious quali-
ties have led some writers to say that the employment relation
has nothing to do with contract law" and certainly lends sup-
port to those who contend that the at-will rule is based more
on economic assumptions 6 than on legal theory. The courts
nevertheless have continued to treat an at-will employment as
a contract rather than a status relationship.
64. P. SELZNICK, supra note 34, at 134 (citing J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CAPITALISM 285 (1924)).
65. Rideout, The Contract of Employment, 19 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 111
(1966). See note 9 supra.
66. Feinman, supra note 26, at 118. See text accompanying notes 73-81 infra.
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In applying a strict contract analysis to this curious rela-
tion, the courts are prevented from finding "further considera-
tion" to support any expectation of future performance by the
employer.6 7 Such consideration is precluded by the rule's cen-
tral and unproven 8 premise that, absent a specified term of
employment, there can be no justified expectation that a con-
tract will continue to exist. The courts are led to rule out,
without any real inquiry, the possibility that the parties may
have contemplated a definite, although unstated, contractual
term of employment or that events occurring in the course of
a continuing employment relation have raised between the
parties an objective, contractual expectancy in the future exis-
tence of the relation. Thus, the at-will rule's assumption that
the employee has retained his right to quit supports, by way
of mutuality, the employer's right to discharge even where
there is clear evidence that the parties intended otherwise, as
where permanent employmente9 or subsequent events-such
as accrual of seniority, pension, or death benefits-have
plainly induced the employee to forego exercise of his right to
terminate at will.70 Since the at-will rule precludes accrual of
any contractual expectancy, employer inducements of contin-
ued employee performance may be viewed as mere gratuities
which do not contractually obligate the employer to continued
performance.71
67. See Note, supra note 33, for an excellent discussion on methods of evading
the at-will rule by finding consideration for a contract of fixed period.
68. See note 35 supra on lack of support for the at-will rule at the time it was
announced.
69. Matin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964) (contract
for permanent employment is terminable at will of either party for any reason what-
soever); Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936) (em-
ployee is terminable at will notwithstanding correspondence indicating permanent
employment was intended).
70. The presence of inducement and detrimental reliance suggests the applica-
tion of promissory estoppel. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Drafts
Nos. 1-7, 1973). See note 130 infra.
71. See, e.g., MacCabe v. Consolidated Edison Co., 30 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1941), where the court said, in considering the employee's rights under a
retirement plan:
'In this state, the rule is settled that, unless a definite period of service
is specified in the contract, the hiring is at will; and the master has the
right to discharge and the servant to leave at any time.' . . . If the hiring
can be terminated at will, and provision for an employee's retirement is
not embodied in a judicially recognizable obligation of the employer,
then whatever provision may be made is, in the eye of the law, not a
right, but a gift.
1981] 1123
1124 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
In practice, then, the mutuality justification for the at-
will rule bears little relation to the contractual requirement of
consideration. Mutuality becomes no more than a device that
permits employers to induce employee dependence while re-
taining absolute discretion to terminate the employee.72
3. Freedom of Enterprise
The rather one-sided nature of the mutuality and con-
tractual freedom of the at-will rule suggests that the true jus-
tification for the rule lies in the doctrine of freedom of enter-
prise. Implicit in this philosophy is the economic assumption
that absolute employer discretion to discharge for any reason
is necessary to facilitate economic growth. Under this reason-
ing the analogous right of the employee to quit at will is irrel-
evant to the rule's justification. Key to the freedom of enter-
prise justification is the conviction that shifting the risks of
business away from employers and onto employees is a neces-
sary social cost of an expanding economy."s The economic jus-
tification for this conviction is doubtful.
Even at the time the at-will rule was announced, other
72. The employee's right to quit, which is used to justify the employer's right to
terminate, is not as great as it might seem. Several causes of action have developed
which limit the employee's ability to quit where the employer's interests might be
injured. Theories concerning unfair competition or trade secrets may effectively limit
the employee's ability to find other work. See note 14 supra and cases collected in
Note, supra note 33, at 364 n.192, 365 n.195. See also Note, An Employer's Competi-
tive Restraints on Former Employees, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 69 (1967). The possibility of
an action for tortious interference with contract may further limit an employee's abil-
ity to take a new job. Patterson Glass Co. v. Thomas, 41 Cal. App. 559, 183 P. 190
(1919) (employment contract is subject to protection by injunction against interfer-
ence by third persons even though contract is terminable at the will of either party).
73. Similar policy considerations led the courts to limit the employer's tort lia-
bility by superimposing the assumption of risk doctrine on the employment relation.
The Supreme Court has observed:
Assumption of risk is a judicially created rule which was developed in
response to the general impulse of common law courts at the beginning
of this period to insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing
the 'human overhead' which is an inevitable part of the cost-to some-
one-of the doing of industrialized business. The general purpose be-
hind this development in the common law seems to have been to give
maximum freedom to expanding industry.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943) (footnotes omitted). Ap-
plication of assumption of risk doctrine to the employment relation was justified by
the freedom of contract notion that employees are free to contractually allocate the
risks of employment. More recently, courts have recognized the absence of contrac-
tual freedom in employment contracts and have applied adhesion concepts to invali-
date employer attempts to limit their liability for negligent injury to employees. See,
e.g., Blanco v. Phoenix Compania De Navigacion, S.A., 304 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1962).
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industrial nations did not find it necessary to give the em-
ployer such broad discretion. Great Britain, for example, pro-
vided a modicum of protection to the employee by implying a
term of employment for one year."' In modern times, the
number of industrial nations that provide some comprehen-
sive protection for employees has grown.78 Even the newly in-
dependent nations of the world, who might be expected to
sacrifice employee interests in the drive for economic develop-
ment, have enacted protective employment legislation. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) has adopted
Recommmendation No. 119 Concerning Termination of Em-
ployment on the Initiative of the Employer, which prohibits
dismissal of an employee "unless there is a valid reason ...
connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based
on the operational requirements of. the undertaking .. .
Although the United States recently rejoined the ILO,7 we
remain the only major industrial nation that does not protect
all employees from the potentially abusive exercise of em-
ployer power.79
In the United States, the free enterprise notions of abso-
lute employer discretion inherent in the at-will rule have been
steadily eroded by collective bargaining agreements, statutory
provisions, and judicial decision. Although the United States
has yet to provide protection to all employees, the rapidly
progressing attempts to limit employer abuse have become so
pervasive that "the courts cannot ignore the new climate pre-
vailing generally in the relationship of employer and em-
74. .See text accompanying note 32 supra.
75. For an excellent review of employee protections in France, West Germany,
Great Britain, and Sweden, see C. Summers, supra note 21, at 508-19.
76. See ILO, DISMISSAL PROCEDURES IN NINE COUNTRIES (1959); Dismissal Pro-
cedures: A Comparative Study, 81 INT'L LAB. REV. 403 (1960).
77. International Labor Conference 1919-66, at 1060-63 (1967). See also Com-
parative Labor Law and Law of the Employment Relation, A Symposium, 18
RUTGERS L. REV. 233 (1964), which contains portions of Recommendation No. 119
and an English translation of an ILO report which traces its development. The re-
port, Regulation of Disputes Concerning the Employer's Exercise of Disciplinary
Power, can be found in II ACTS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF LABOUR
LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY (1963). The requirement of "valid reason" quoted in the
text can be found in section 2(a) of the report, reprinted in Extracts from the Inter-
national Labor Office Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 446, 449 (1964).
78. President's Statement on the U.S. Decision to Rejoin the ILO, 16 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 306 (Feb. 13, 1980).
79. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASs'N, THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 106 (G. Somers ed. 1973).
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ployee." 80 It is no longer credible to assert that the discretion
conferred on the employer by the at-will rule is necessary to
the effective functioning of the American enterprise. Indeed,
the United States is now in an anomalous situation where two
bodies of law co-exist, even within the same company: one
body of law grants broad protection to some employees while
the other denies any protection to other employees." If it is
admitted that the protection from employer abuse given to
civil servants and workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements is not inimical to American enterprise, it becomes
extremely difficult to justify the unlimited discretion which
employers exercise under the at-will rule.
C. Employer Control of the Workplace: A Justification for a
Limited At-Will Rule
The single common denominator between these diverse
bodies of American industrial jurisprudence provides the only
continuing justification for the at-will rule. Professor Werne
has observed: "Anglo-American common law established fully
that the right of the employer to discipline his employees is a
basic management prerogative. This authority flows from
management's responsibility for the efficient functioning of
the plant. '82 To the extent the at-will rule achieves this pur-
pose it appears justified. But where the exercise of dismissal
power is not reasonably related to the legitimate functions of
the enterprise, it should be carefully scrutinized with a view
toward protection of employee interests that may be unneces-
sarily harmed. 83
80. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
81. C. Summers, supra note 21, at 483. Professor Summers notes that "[t]his
cleavage in our industrial jurisprudence, which leaves the majority of workers without
any protection against arbitrary discipline, becomes even more anomalous when our
law is compared with that of other countries." Workers in the United States pro-
tected by collective bargaining agreements often have more complete and effective
protection than employees in any other country, while unprotected classes of Ameri-
can workers are "almost alone" in the world in not having any general protection
against unjust dismissal. Id. at 483-84. See also D. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE OR-
GANIZATION 229-30 (1977).
82. 1 B. WERNE, ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR CONTRACT 370 (1963).
83. Several writers contend that the at-will rule has lost all credibility. See
Blumrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning the Exercise of Employer Discre-
tionary Power: United States Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 428 (1964) (American
law "may be moving toward a general requirement of just cause and fair dealing be-
tween employer and employee."). Most recently, Professor Blumrosen has argued
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That the interests of employee and employer can be bal-
anced without harm to commercial enterprise is amply
demonstrated by the other regimes of our industrial jurispru-
dence. In every legal regime that limits the employer's power
to discharge-whether it is collective bargaining, statutory
protection, or the developing common law limitations-the
law has preserved the right of the employer to manage the
enterprise and direct the work force. Requiring just cause for
dismissal is generally recognized as not intruding on this vital
area of employer prerogative." In each of these regimes, the
interests of the employee are recognized and balanced against
those of the employer. The at-will rule, however, precludes
any balancing of interests. When interpreted to permit dis-
charge "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong" 85 the at-will rule plainly confers power on the em-
ployer which far exceeds that necessary to achieve its purpose.
The exercise of this excess power that is unrelated to direction
of the work force toward achievement of the legitimate goals
of the enterprise, has often been the vehicle for infliction of
unnecessary, unwarranted, and unconscionable injuries upon
that the Equal Protection Clause extends to all workers the protection against arbi-
trary dismissal that minorities and women receive under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Professors Glendon and Lev contend that the evolution of the law has
thoroughly eroded the foundation of the at-will rule and it now awaits a merciful
retirement. Glendon & Lev, supra note 19, at 460-61 (1979).
Although much of the justification for the rule is discredited, this comment con-
tends that the at-will rule remains valid to the extent that it assures employer control
of the work force in pursuit of the legitimate goals of the enterprise. Nor could the
California courts afford the views of Professors Blumrosen, Glendon, and Lev. A vari-
ant of the at-will rule is enacted in CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1974) which provides
in part: "An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of
either party on notice to the other .... Employment for a specified term means an
employment for greater than one month." Nothing in this statute, however, requires
absolute employer discretion. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
84. The standard of good faith advanced in this comment is less intrusive on
employer perogative than the good cause standard commonly used in collective bar-
gaining requirements. The good cause standard imposes on the employer the burden
of proving a justification for termination. Under the good faith standard, however,
the employee has the burden of proving bad faith termination. See Note, Con-
tracts-Employment at Will: Contractual Remedy for Discharge Motivated by Bad
Faith, Malice, or Retaliation-Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 232, 240 (1974-1975).
85. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). See also
Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 555, 112 P.
886, 888 (1910).
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employee interests. To argue that discredited notions of free-
dom of contract or mutuality of obligation have fairly limited
employee's compensable interests to those almost nonexistent
contractual expectancies of a terminable at-will employment
contract does little for the reputation of justice.6
III. LIMITING THE AT-WILL RULE IN THE NAME OF PUBLIC
POLICY
The potential for abuse of the employer's excess power
has not gone unnoticed by the courts. In the last twenty years,
the courts have confronted a growing number of unjust dis-
charge cases which clearly demand a remedy. The difficulty in
providing a remedy is finding a basis for defining and then
imposing those duties on what is essentially a private relation-
ship. By what right or rationale may the courts intrude to ad-
just the rights and obligations within the private employment
relationship?
Thus far, the major rationale for judicial intervention
centers on the presence of some statute or judicial expression
of public policy. If either the coercive force of permittng a dis-
charge or the employer's motive for discharge tends to frus-
trate such a policy, the courts will grant the injured employee
a tort cause of action. In these cases, the tort action is in-
tended not so much to compensate the injured employee as to
deter employer injury to the state's policy interests. The effect
of the cases, however, is to provide protection to an expanding
range of employee interests.
A. The Origin of the Public Policy Rationale
The seminal case in this area is Petermann v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters.8 7 During the course of an
investigation into Teamster activities, Petermann, a Teamster
employee, was subpoenaed to testify before a State Assembly
committee. Prior to his testimony, the Teamster's Secretary-
Treasurer instructed Petermann to give false testimony.
Petermann did not follow instructions and was fired the next
day.
The trial court granted the union's motion for judgment
86. See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
87. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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on the pleadings. The court of appeal reversed, holding that
the employer's right to discharge under an at-will contract
may be limited by statute" or by "considerations of public
policy. '89 Since no statute specifically prohibited discharge for
refusing to commit perjury, the court was left with the public
policy arm of the exception to absolute employer discretion.
The court recognized the inherent impossibility of providing a
precise definition of "public policy" and instead offered a va-
riety of definitions advanced by commentators and cases.' 0
The court noted that both the commission and solicitation for
the commission of perjury were illegal" and that to permit
discharge in this situation would be "obnoxious to the inter-
ests of the state and contrary to public policy."' 2 Although
criminal penalties would normally be sufficient to deter the
commission or solicitation of perjury, the Petermann court
found no reason to deny a civil action which tended to effectu-
ate the declared policy of the state." In so concluding, the
88. The court cited as an example CAL. ELEC. CODE § 695 (1939) (current ver-
sion at § 1655 (West 1977)) which prohibits discharge of an employee for serving as
an election officer. The statute, however, does not provide the discharged employee
with a cause of action. A civil cause of action was implied in Kouff v. Bethlehem
Alameda Shipyd, Inc., 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949). Other statutes also
prohibit discharge for exercise of specific employee rights. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 1101-1105 (West 1971), discussed in Note, California's Controls on Employer
Abuse of Employee Political Rights, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1015 (1970).
89. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
90. The Petermann court's discussion deserves repetition here.
'The term "public policy" is inherently not subject to precise definition.
. . . "The question, what is public policy in a given case, is as broad as
the question of what is fraud." Also . . . "[p]ublic policy is a vague ex-
pression, and few cases can arise in which its application may not be
disputed. Mr. Story in his work on Contracts (§ 546), says: 'It has never
been defined by the courts, but has been left loose and free of definition
in the same manner as fraud.' By 'public policy' is intended that princi-
ple of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good .......
[quoting] (Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks etc., Assn., 41 Cal. 2d 567,
575 (261 P.2d 721]) (emphasis added).
In 72 Corpus Juris Secundum ... it is stated that public policy 'is
the principles under which freedom of contract or private dealing is re-
stricted by law for the good of the community. Another statement,
sometimes referred to as a definition, is that whatever contravenes good
morals or any established interest of society is against public policy.'
174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (citations omitted).
91. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 118, 653(f) (West 1970).
92. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (emphasis added).
93. Presumably, the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution by which the
state's interest might be vindicated was still available against the Teamsters for solic-
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court implied both a limitation on the at-will rule and a non-
statutory cause of action for the employee injured by the exer-
cise of excessive employer power.9 4
A similar rationale was used in Glenn v. Clearman's
Golden Cock Inn, Inc.,9 5 where plaintiff employees were alleg-
edly discharged because of their attempts to organize a union.
The court of appeal held that a cause of action for damages
was implied from the California Legislature's declared policy
of recognizing the right of employees to organize." The court
reasoned that an exception to the employer's otherwise unre-
strained power to discharge must be made in order to effectu-
ate the State's interest in providing employees a means-in
this case unionization-of self-protection against excessive
employer power. Although the public policy involved in Glenn
was more directly related to the employee qua employee than
that in Petermann, the court's method was the same; consid-
erations of public policy were found to limit the employer's
right to discharge and where employer action exceeds those
acceptable limits, a cause of action will be implied to protect
state and employee interests.
B. Expansion of Employee Protection Under the Public
Policy Rationale
Language in both Petermann and Glenn suggested that a
broad scope of policy concerns may provide a basis for limita-
tions on excessive employer power. Later California cases,
itation of perjury. If the state's interests are not without a remedy the practical, al-
though unstated, reason for granting Petermann a cause of action is to vindicate in-
jury to employee interests caused by employer conduct that the courts will not
tolerate.
94. Upon remand, Petermann obtained an award of $50,000 as damages for
wrongful discharge. The judgment was affirmed in Petermann v. Teamsters Local
396, 214 Cal. App. 2d 155, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1963).
95. 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961).
96. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 922-923 (West 1971). Section 923 declares the public pol-
icy of the state and provides in part:
Negotiations of terms and conditions of labor should result from volun-
tary agreement between employer and employees. Governmental author-
ity has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the corporate
and other forms of capital control. In dealing with such employers, the
individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty of
contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain ac-
ceptable terms and conditions of employment.
(Emphasis added).
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however, interpreted the Petermann-Glenn rationale as lim-
ited to legislatively expressed policies which proscribed crimi-
nal behavior (Petermann) or which directly affected the em-
ployment relation (Glenn). 7 Outside of California, the public
policy limitation on employer power went unused until the
1970's when Petermann suddenly became the basis for a vari-
ety of decisions favoring employees in diverse factual situa-
tions.98 Some of these cases fit within the narrow reading
given to Petermann by California courts. Others, however,
have read the rationale more broadly, and have granted relief
even in the absence of a legislatively expressed public policy.
1. Discharge in Retaliation for Filing a Workman's
Compensation Claim
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.9 is representative
97. See, e.g., Becket v. Welton & Assocs., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr.
531 (1974) (employee acting as executor of his father's estate and who sued employer
for accounting of estate's assets has no cause of action when discharged by employer
because employee refused to dismiss the suit); Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal.
App. 2d 63, 60 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967) (employee with an at-will employment contract
has no cause of action against employer who discharges him due to allegedly false
performance rating, as long as no statute or public policy is violated); Mallard v. Bor-
ing, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960) (notwithstanding the importance of
jury service to proper functioning of legal system, employee has no cause of action
when discharged for accepting jury duty). But see Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App.
3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970) (statutory policy protecting employee's right to organ-
ize and choose representatives is broadly construed and employee has cause of action
when discharged because she hired an attorney to represent her); Wetherton v. Grow-
ers Farm Labor Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 168, 79 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1969) (employees who
allege that members of association entered into a conspiracy to coerce employees not
to join labor organization have a cause of action).
98. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979), Frampton v.
Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), and Svento v. Kroger Co.,
69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) (discharge in retaliation for filing a work-
man's compensation claim violates public policy and employee alleging such dis-
charge states a cause of action for damages despite general rule that employment at
will may be terminated for any reason); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512
(1975) and Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978)
(cause of action for compensatory damages is stated by allegation that employee was
discharged for accepting jury duty; punitive damages available in future cases);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. S.Ct. 1978) (at-will
bank employee states cause of action on allegation that discharge was in retaliation
for efforts to require employer compliance with consumer credit laws). Other courts
have acknowledged a willingness to recognize limitations on employer power when
presented with the proper case. See, e.g., Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507,
573 P.2d 907 (1977); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 333, 563 P.2d
54, 57 (1977); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 889, 568 P.2d 765,
770 (1977).
99. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
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of several cases that protect policies inherent in state work-
man's compensation laws. In Frampton, an employee injured
her arm while working. Upon returning to work, she exper-
ienced continued difficulty with the arm although she was
able to perform her duties capably. She avoided filing a work-
man's compensation claim for fear of losing her job but finally
did file nineteen months after the injury, claiming a thirty
percent loss in the use of her arm. She received a settlement
for the injury and was fired a month later without explana-
tion. The employee sued for actual and punitive damages, al-
leging that the discharge was in retaliation for filing the work-
man's compensation claim. The case came before the Indiana
Supreme Court on appeal from the lower court's dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action.
The Indiana Supreme Court held that the allegations of
retaliatory discharge presented a question of fact which, if
proved, "would constitute an intentional, wrongful act on the
part of the employer for which the injured employee is enti-
tled to be fully compensated in damages." 100 The court re-
viewed the history and purposes of the workman's compensa-
tion statutes and found that they created a "duty in the
employer to compensate employees for work-related injuries
(through insurance) and a right in the employee to receive
such compensation.''0 Although, strictly speaking, the em-
ployer had complied with his duty to compensate, permitting
retaliatory discharge would have the practical effect of inhib-
iting employee claims and would frustrate the compensatory
policy of the statute. Moreover, permitting retaliatory dis-
charge "opens the door to coercion and other duress-provok-
ing acts. ' 102 The court admitted the absence of precedent for
its conclusion but analogized to parallel developments in land-
lord-tenant law which declared that retaliatory evictions of-
fend public policy and may be raised as a defense in actions
by landlords for possession.103 The court then cited the Cali-
fornia case of Aweeka v. Bonds1 0 4 for the proposition that re-
100. Id. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
101. Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
102. Id. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 428. This language suggests that coercive use of
employer power may be limited in other situations.
103. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Schweiger v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
104. 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971). The analogy between retalia-
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taliatory eviction may be redressed by an affirmative cause of
action in tort.
Frampton certainly fits within the narrower reading of
Petermann, as the policy of the workman's compensation
statutes impacts directly on the employment relationship. In
Frampton, however, the cutting edge of the employer's coer-
cive power fell directly on the employee's interest in contin-
ued employment rather than on the state's interest expressed
by the statute. Permitting the cause of action in Frampton
did not directly promote a statutory goal as the cause of ac-
tion in Petermann did. Petermann observed the stated public
policy and refused to perjure himself. Frampton, however, re-
ceived the compensatory benefits that the statute sought to
achieve. Thus, the vindication of state policy was of secondary
importance to the compensation of the employee's injury
when wrongfully discharged. Frampton, then, suggests that
the private interests of the employee in continuing employ-
ment must be considered in evaluating the negative impact of
coercive employer power.
2. Discharge in Retaliation for Accepting Jury Duty
The cases granting a cause of action to employees dis-
charged for accepting jury duty 0 5 demonstrate a further ex-
pansion of the public policy rationale for limiting employer
power. The statutory basis for the public policy involved is
somewhat vague, arising not so much from a specific statute
creating rights or duties in either employer or employee, but
rather from the importance of trial by jury, the summons
power which often attaches to the imposition of jury duty,
and general considerations of judicial efficiency. 106 Unlike the
workman's compensation statutes, the policies involved in the
jury duty cases do not directly affect the rights and duties of
employer and employee as such. 107 Nor is the employee likely
tory discharge and retaliatory eviction was not new. Although not cited by the Indi-
ana court, the Petermann case figured heavily in the reasoning of the court in
Aweeka v. Bonds.
105. People v. Vitucci, 49 Ill. App. 2d 171, 199 N.E.2d 78 (1964); Nees v. Hocks,
272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc. 255 Pa. Super.
Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 19 (1978) (employer who discharges employee due to absence be-
cause of jury duty is liable for damages or guilty of contempt of court).
106. Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 32, 386 A.2d
119, 120-21 (1978).
107. But see Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976),
where the court denied a cause of action to an employee discharged because he exer-
113319811
1134 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
to become subject to criminal sanctions if he succumbs to em-
ployer pressure and declines jury service. 10 8 Nevertheless, sev-
eral courts have held the policy considerations involved to be
of sufficient importance to warrant a tort cause of acion to
limit employer power to discharge when an employee accepts
jury duty. 09
For example, in Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc."0 a
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an employee stated a
cause of action where he alleged that he was "maliciously,
wrongfully, injuriously and intentionally discharged""' for
having taken a week off work to serve on a jury. The court
observed that although there is generally no nonstatutory
cause of action for termination of an at-will employment rela-
tionship, the employer's power may be limited where a clear
cised his statutory right as a shareholder to inspect corporate books. The court distin-
guished Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), saying
we believe it to be significant that the conduct of the plaintiff for which
she was discharged in Nees (her refusal to request that she be excused
from jury duty in order that she might perform her duties as an em-
ployee) related much more directly to her rights as an employee than
did the conduct of the plaintiff in this case. His demand to inspect cor-
porate books and records was an attempt to exercise his rights as a
stockholder, and had no direct relation to his rights as an employee.
274 Or. at 250-51, 546 P.2d at 146.
108. But see Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 34 n.6,
386 A.2d 119, 121 n.6 (1978) (accepting jury service may constitute refusal to commit
perjury where employer advised employee to "tell them you formed an opinion by
what you read in the newspaper.").
109. See cases cited note 105 supra. A few legislatures have prohibited dis-
charge of employees who accept jury duty. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West 1971)
(prohibiting discharge of employee for acceptance of jury duty); 44 MASS. GEN. LAWS.
ANN. ch. 268, § 14(a) (West 1971) (making contemptous employer's discharge of em-
ployee performing jury duty). Although the California statute does not provide the
discharged employee with a cause of action, one may be implied in the same manner
as with other statutory limitations on employer discharge power. See note 88 supra.
Section 230, as amended by 1978 Cal. Stats., ch. 161, § 1, at 392, abrogated the result
in Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960), captioned at note
97 supra. Therefore, California employees enjoy the same limitation of employer
power regarding performance of jury duty as created by the cases discussed here.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 230(c) now provides in part:
Any employee who is discharged, threatened with discharge, demoted,
suspended, or in any manner discriminated against in the terms and
conditions of such employment by his employer because such employee
has taken time off to serve on an inquest or trial jury or to appear in
court as a witness shall be entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement
for lost wages and work benefits caused by such acts of the employer.
110. 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1971).
111. Id.
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public policy would otherwise be violated. The court quoted
an earlier Pennsylvania Supreme Court case that recognized
the possibility of limitations on employer power:
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's
life in which his employer has no legitimate interest. An
intrusion into one of these areas by virtue of the em-
ployer's power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a
cause of action, particularly where some recognized facet
of public policy is threatened. '
The court found a recognized facet of public policy in the va-
rious provisions of state and federal constitutions and statutes
that demonstrate the importance of trial by jury. From this,
the court implied a civic obligation that each individual car-
ried with him into the employment relation. The "necessity of
having citizens freely available for jury service" ' s was a suffi-
cient state policy interest to warrant limitation of employer
power by implying a tort cause of action for a discharged em-
ployee. Finally, the court overruled the nonsuit granted by the
lower court based on plaintiff's evidence which suggested that
112. Id. at 31, 386 A.2d at 120 (quoting Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456
Pa. 171, 184, 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974)) (emphasis added). The Geary court went on to
say, "The notion that substantive due process elevates an employer's privilege of hir-
ing and discharging his employees to an absolute constitutional right has long since
been discredited." 456 Pa. at 184, 319 A.2d at 174. In Geary the court sustained the
discharge of an employee who went over the head of his immediate supervisor in a
successful effort to have a dangerous product withdrawn from the market. Appar-
ently, the policy of products liability law that seeks to limit distribution of defective
products, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), was not a sufficient
basis to warrant protection of Geary's employment interests. Cases like Geary, where
the employee is discharged for what is in essence an action to secure the employer's
best interests, are difficult to justify. They are perhaps explained by the perception
that the conflict is internal and purely private. If, however, Geary had reported the
dangerous product to a concerned regulatory agency, he might well be afforded pro-
tection even though such action is not, from the employer's viewpoint, the best means
of protecting his employer's interests. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont,
246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. S. Ct. 1978) and text accompanying notes infra. See also
Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the Whis-
tle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L.
REV. 777. This conflict may be particularly acute where the employee's actions ema-
nate from a sense of obligation to observe professional standards. See Blades, supra
note 14, at 1408; Note, Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who
Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional Eth-
ics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805 (1975). California attorneys may enjoy a bit more protection
in this regard due to the quasi-statutory status of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct.
113. Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 33, 386 A.2d
119, 121 (1978).
1981] 1135
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
he was fired, not because of jury service, but because he was
discourteous and inconsiderate in failing to notify his em-
ployer that he would be absent from work. Although this
would be a justifiable reason for discharge, 1 4 the conflicting
evidence of discharge in retaliation for accepting jury service
presented a question of fact for the jury to decide.115
The Reuther case presents a further broadening of the
public policy rationale. The policy interests considered are
more attenuated than those in Petermann or Frampton. In
using the term "recognized facet of public policy" the court
minimizes the need for a clear statutory source for the policy.
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the competing
interests of employer and employee are openly considered and
assigned relative values. Both the language quoted from
Geary v. United States Steel and the characterization of the
question of fact to be presented to the jury suggest that only
certain legitimate employer interests will justify an exercise of
discharge power that would intrude on the essentially per-
sonal rights and duties that the employee enjoys in his status
as a citizen. Thus, when carried into the employment relation-
ship, the exercise of a citizen's duty to perform jury service
becomes an employee's personal right to be free from em-
ployer disciplinary power having no relation to legitimate em-
ployer interests.
3. Discharge in Retaliation for Employee's Efforts to
Prevent Employer's Illegal Acts
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont"6 presents
the broadest application of the public policy rationale to date.
During the course of his employment as a manager of First
National's consumer credit department, Harless became aware
of intentional violations of state and federal consumer credit
and protection laws. He brought these practices to the atten-
tion of his superiors. Harless was then fired in June 1975 but
reinstated a week later. Several months later he informed a
member of the bank's Board of Directors of continued illegal
practices. Within weeks, he was demoted in a manner alleg-
edly calculated to embarrass and humiliate him. Harless re-
114. Id. at 34, 386 A.2d at 122. The court noted that "even when an important
public policy is involved, an employer may discharge an employee if he has a sepa-
rate, plausible, and legitimate reason for doing so." Id.
115. Id.
116. 246 S.E.2d'270 (W. Va. S.Ct. 1978).
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tained counsel who made further contacts with Board mem-
bers. An investigation was initiated that resulted in
reinstatement to his former position in November 1976.
Shortly thereafter, he was interviewed by an outside auditor
who was reviewing the bank's consumer credit practices. Upon
being informed the audit was confidential Harless turned over
certain incriminating documents that he had retrieved from
wastebaskets. A few days later, Harless was summarily fired
without any reason being given.
Harless sued on two counts, the first alleging discharge in
retaliation for his efforts to require First National's compli-
ance with consumer credit laws, and the second alleging that
the manner in which he was fired was extreme, malicious, and
outrageous resulting in severe emotional distress. The West
Virginia Supreme Court sustained both causes of action hold-
ing that a discharge "motivated by an intention to contravene
some substantial public policy ' '117 was actionable in tort and
that damages could be recovered for emotional or mental dis-
tress resulting from such intentional or wanton wrongful
acts.118 The court reasoned that the "substantial public pol-
icy" inherent in the consumer credit laws would be frustrated
by permitting a lending institution to discharge an employee
who sought to insure employer compliance with the law.
Significantly, the public policy involved here has no di-
rect impact on the employment relationship as such. Nor does
it create any specific right or duty in the employee as in the
workman's compensation or jury duty cases. The coercive im-
pact of employer power is also absent here; Harless was not
forced to choose between retaining his job or actively commit-
ting a crime as in Petermann. The only support for his actions
is the somewhat vague policy contained in the old common
law actions for misprision of a felony that encourage citizen
disclosure of criminal acts.119 Here, the public policy involved
in the consumer credit laws is focused entirely on the permis-
sible scope of the bank's conduct. Clearly, the bank had a
duty to cease violating the law, but the nature of that duty
117. Id. at 273. The employee, of course, carries the burden of proving this mo-
tive and intent.
118. Id. at 276.
119. For a discussion of misprision in the employment context, see Blumberg,
Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279, 294 (1971).
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makes it doubtful that permitting a cause of action for tor-
tious discharge will add much to the deterrent effect of statu-
tory penalties. Thus, many of the considerations that led the
courts to impose liability in earlier cases are absent or consid-
erably diminished in Harless. The result is that protection
from employer power is given to an employee who might oth-
erwise be considered a mere officious intermeddler in his em-
ployer's affairs. The focus in Harless shifts from the em-
ployee's right or duty to act or not act to the legitimacy of
employer behavior. If the employer has no legitimate purpose
for his acts, the employee cannot be subjected to discipline for
attempting to change or to stop them. Thus, the interests of
the employees that are protected have nothing to do with the
public policy which limits employer power.
C. The Limits of the Public Policy Rationale
The public policy exceptions are of limited utility in pro-
tecting employee interests from excessive employer power.
What protection employees do receive seems to be incidental
to the protection of larger "public" interests. At least on its
surface, the public policy rationale precludes consideration of
employee interests alone as a justification for limiting em-
ployer power. Thus, the courts applying the rationale, like
those applying the at-will rule, fail to attach legal significance
to the internal characteristics of the employment relationship.
The concern is not so much for potential overbearing and in-
jury to a weaker party, but rather for limiting those repercus-
sions emanating from such behavior that have an unaccept-
able effect on public interests. Implicit is the assumption that,
like those other domestic relations from which the law of
master and servant emerged, 120 the employment relation is a
private affair with which the state should seldom interfere.
Several courts have denied protection to discharged employ-
ees precisely because their interests were "merely private. 1 2'
120. See note 27 supra.
121. Becket v. Welton Becket & Assocs., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531
(1974) (employee acting as executor of father's estate who sued employer for account-
ing of estate's assets has no cause of action when discharged because he refused em-
ployer's demand to dismiss the suit; executor's fiduciary duty to protect legal rights
of the estate is private in nature); Campbell v. Ford Indus. Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d
141 (1976) (employee shareholder fired after exercising shareholder's statutory right
to examine corporate books; right to examine books is for protection of private pro-
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If, however, the demise of substantive due process and the ra-
pacious concepts of strict contractual freedom and laissez-
faire teach anything, it is that the conduct of private affairs
may well have a wide impact of general concern to all. Indeed,
when compared to its progenitor of the nineteenth century,
the modern employment relationship is highly regulated. The
statute books are replete with laws predicated on policy state-
ments recognizing the public impact of private conduct within
the employment relationship.' 22 Thus, it is not entirely accu-
rate to say than an employee's concern in maintaining his
livelihood is, in the largest sense, "merely private.' 3 Nor is it
true that our system of law condones the infliction of injury
without justification simply because it occurs within such a
questionably "private" relationship.'2 4
To the extent that the public policy rationale narrowly
focuses only on the external impacts of conduct inside the em-
ployment relation to the exclusion of an open assessment of
the legitimate justifications for the exercise of employer power
it will fail to provide the comprehensive protection that em-
ployee interests require. Public policy exceptions to the at-will
rule announced in the last ten years, however, have not been
so narrowly focused. Employee interests having little to do
with the policies in question have received protection. Policy
considerations that once focused on the justification for em-
ployee action are now focusing on the legitimacy of the exer-
cise of employer power. With increasing frequency, the lan-
guage used by the courts betrays a recognition that employer
discretion is not absolute, and that "there are areas of an em-
prietary interests of shareholders and is not based on substantial public policy).
122. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 100 (West 1972) which provides in part:
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this division the
public policy of this State is declared as follows:
Experience has shown that large numbers of the population of Cali-
fornia do not enjoy permanent employment by reason of which their
purchasing power is unstable. This is detrimental to the interests of the
people of California as a whole.
One intended purpose of the compensation law is "to reduce involuntary unemploy-
ment and the suffering caused thereby." Id.
123. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974)
("A termination by the employer of a contract of employment at-will which is moti-
vated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the
economic system or the public good.").
124. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3523 (West 1970) provides: "For every wrong there
is a remedy."
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ployee's life in which his employer has no legitimate
interests."'125
It seems apparent that in developing further public policy
exceptions to the at-will rule, the courts are in reality taking
the first steps toward reevaluation of the rule and the recogni-
tion that employer discretion must be balanced against public
and employee interests in maintaining employment." 6 The
case-by-case approach of recognizing public policy exceptions
has permitted the courts to ease into the task of reassessing
the justifiable limits of employer discretion. As this hidden
agenda of the various exceptions becomes clear, however, the
limited 27 and sometimes inconsistent'28 results of the public
policy rationale will become less tolerable. At that point, the
courts must develop an analysis, based squarely on the reali-
ties of the employment relationship, that will provide em-
ployee protection while maintaining the degree of employer
discretion necessary to achieve the legitimate goals of the en-
terprise. Such an analysis must recognize that the manner in
which ostensibly private employment relations are conducted
is of general importance because of the otherwise high poten-
tial for abuse in our "nation of employees." 129
125. Geary v. United States Steel, 456 Pa. 171, 184, 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974).
126. Glendon & Lev, supra note 19, at 468 ("Even in recent cases that favor
employers and purportedly follow the [at-will rule], courts have begun to recognize
exceptions in the fashion characteristic of that common law process which often leads
to the interment of an unsatisfactory rule.") Id.
127. See cases cited at note 121 supra, demonstrating the public policy ratio-
nale's failure to protect "merely private" employee interests. When viewed from an
interest balancing perspective there is little justification for failing to protect the ex-
ercise of the employee's private shareholder rights or executor duties where such ex-
ercise does not interfere with employer direction of the work force to achieve the
legitimate goals of the enterprise. The supression of shareholder inquiry or civil suit
by coercive force of a magnitude similar to termination of employment would not be
tolerated in another context. In the absence of any interference with employer con-
trol, no good reason exists to require employees to check these rights or duties at the
employer's door.
128. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 646, 152 Cal. Rptr.
52 (L.A. No. 31000, hearing granted April 12, 1979). The lower court sustained de-
murrer to tortious discharge actions where the employee refused employer's orders to
perform acts in violation of the Cartwright Act and an outstanding injunction. The
case would seem to fit well within the illegal acts exception to the at-will rule estab-
lished in Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 334
P.2d 25 (1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 87-94 supra.
129. F. TANNENBAUM, supra note 16. See quote accompanying note 16 supra.
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IV. BALANCING EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE INTERESTS USING
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
The major difficulty in balancing the gross power dispar-
ity within the at-will employment relation lies in traditional
judicial resistance to the creation and imposition of rights and
duties that supplement or limit those created by an existing
contract. This resistance is particularly apparent when the
court uses contractual theories in an attempt to limit poten-
tial employer abuse.'80 Such attempts are frustrated by the
theoretical difficulties of adjusting concepts of consideration
to support any modification of the rights and obligations cre-
ated by consent.O '5 This theoretical rigidity is largely due to
the tendency of contract theory to examine the relationship of
the parties as the unique product of an isolated transaction
rather than a manifestation of a larger social process.132 Ac-
cordingly, those equitable theories developed in contract law
by which the courts limit abuse by stronger parties-theories
of adhesion, unconscionability, and economic duress-are
used only to invalidate overreaching contractual terms rather
than to create separate obligations based on the general char-
acteristics of the contract relationship. These theories are of
little use in an at-will contract where contractual terms and
expectancies are almost nonexistent. 8' The very absence of
contract terms leaves the at-will employee subject to employer
abuse. Therefore, any effective balancing of employer-em-
ployee interests will depend on the characteristics of the at-
will employment relationship.
There is growing judicial recognition that the concentra-
tion of economic and other forms of power exposes our popu-
lation to abuse by stronger parties. Responding to these risks,
the courts have developed various methods to impose obliga-
130. See Note, supra note 33, for a discussion of techniques of finding addi-
tional consideration to avoid classification of an employment contract as terminable
at will. On the proposed use of promissory estoppel, see Fuchs, Promissory Estoppel
and Employment Agreements, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 386 (1977). While these techniques
may provide relief from employer abuse in isolated cases, they fail to fundamentally
reevaluate the at-will relationship itself.
131. Blades, supra note 14, at 1421.
132. But see Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CALIF. L. REv. 691
(1974); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neo-Classical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. L. REv. 854 (1978).
133. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
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tions based upon notions of status or relationship.3 " In the
process, the courts often update antiquated legal theories by
imposing duties based on an assessment of modern and social
realities. One method for imposing such duties utilizes the im-
plied-by-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Cali-
fornia, the covenant of good faith is implied in every contract
and requires that neither party will do anything to injure the
right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.3 '
Generally, breach of the covenant sounds in contract. But,
where judicial intervention is necessary to restore balance to
contractual relationships infused with broad public concerns,
breach of the duties arising from the covenant are actionable
in tort.
The general definition of the duty of good faith-to do
nothing to injure-is necessarily vague. The precise nature of
the duties imposed under the covenant will depend on the na-
ture of the various relationships in which they are implied. As
Professor Robert Summers explains, good faith acts as an "ex-
cluder" of certain defined conduct.13' Good faith is defined by
contrast with the various forms of "bad faith" that the courts
seek to rule out in a given situation. Thus, in insurance con-
tracts, for example, the covenant of good faith imposes a duty
on the insurer not to expose its insureds to risks of loss
greater than the policy limits by failing to accept reasonable
settlement offers within policy limits. '7 In effect, the court
prohibits the insurer from limiting its own losses by exposing
its insureds to further risks. To allow such conduct would in-
jure the insured's right to receive the benefits of his agree-
ment, in this case the expectation that purchasing an insur-
ance policy will provide shelter from extensive liability. The
expected insurance coverage that the covenant protects is not,
134. Goodman & Seaton, supra note 8, at 316; compare Tobriner, supra note 1,
at 1249 with Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311 (1981) (opinion by
Grodin, J.).
135. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328
P.2d 198, 200 (1950).
136. R. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 201 (1968). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231, comment at 521 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7,
1973).
137. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
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however, defined by the contract. Strictly speaking, the in-
surer has no contractual obligation to accept settlement offers.
Instead, the duty to settle and the expectation of coverage it
secures is derived from a mix of policy and practical consider-
ations reflecting the realities of the insurance relationship.
The insurance and employment relationships are by no
means identical, nor need they be to warrant imposing duties
of good faith. Many of the factors that led the courts to im-
pose duties on insurers are also present in the employment
relationship. 138 Defining the employer's duty of good faith
would, of course, depend upon an assessment of the policy
and practical considerations involved in the employment rela-
tionship. The duty imposed must secure the employee's right
to receive the benefits of the agreement while maintaining the
employer's control of the work force in pursuit of the legiti-
mate goals of the enterprise. This balance can be achieved by
permitting a tort cause of action for breach of the duty of
good faith when an employee can prove that he was dis-
charged for reasons unrelated to the employer's legitimate in-
terest in directing the business.
A. Factors Warranting Imposition of a Duty of Good Faith
The factors courts consider in defining a duty of good
faith focus on the disparity of power between the parties, the
potential for injury, and the public interest in maintaining
balance in contractual relationships entered into by necessity
rather than for commercial advantage.
1. Contract of Adhesion
There is little doubt that the vast majority of at-will con-
tracts are not the product of arms-length bargaining. The Cal-
ifornia Legislature has recognized as a matter of policy that
"the individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise ac-
tual liberty of contract . .. to obtain acceptable terms and
conditions of employment.' 39 In our industrialized society,
only the comparatively rare and fortunate employee has suffi-
cient bargaining strength to impose conditions on his offer to
perform services. 140 For the rest, employment is a take-it-or-
138. See text accompanying notes 139-58 infra.
139. CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1971).
140. See, e.g., Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 781, 784 (1961).
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leave-it proposition. Even for those who enjoy the luxury of
bargaining, it is unlikely that parties forming an employment
relationship will discuss the means of its termination."1 Thus,
the absence of a specified period of employment or specified
terms of dismissal will raise the spectre of the at-will rule with
all its potential for abuse." 2
Although the absence of adhesion alone should not pre-
vent implications of a duty of good faith,"13 its presence has
traditionally aroused judicial inclination "to protect the
weaker party against the harshness of the common law and
. . . [the] abuses of freedom of contract"' that often result.
Contracts of adhesion generally arise in market situations
where negotiation of individual contracts would cripple the
enterprise due to the sheer volume of transactions involved.
Thus, adhesion contracts do serve a useful social purpose. The
difficulty arises when the adhesion contract defines the rights
and obligations of its users more narrowly than they might
reasonably expect. In this event, the courts will step in be-
cause of the disparate bargaining status of the parties and as-
sure those expectations that reasonably would have been se-
cured had good faith bargaining been available.' The
adhesion contract is treated by the courts as a marketing de-
vice securing access to the mass market which carries with it
the corresponding duties to the public. In a similar manner,
employers use the adhesion contract to mass market jobs."'
141. Comment, Employment Contracts Terminable at Will: Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co. and Bad Faith Discharge, 63 Ky. L.J. 513, 524 (1975).
142. Even where the at-will termination power is bargained for "a party pre-
sumably agrees merely to the grant of a power, and not also to the grant of a power to
abuse a power." R. Summers, supra note 136, at 251 n.222. Thus, even if an at-will
employee enjoyed an opportunity to bargain, the problem of defining bad faith
("abuse") remains.
143. Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 66 Cal. App. 3d 951, 136 Cal. Rptr. 404
(1977) (implied duty of good faith is breached where insurer cancels extensively nego-
tiated terminable at-will insurance policy for reasons unrelated to purpose of policy).
See also L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968) (cancellation
of terminable at-will malpractice insurance policy to stifle testimony against other
insureds of insurer violates public policy).
144. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 636 (1943).
145. Tobriner, supra note 2, at 8 (quoting Gray v. Zurick Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d
263, 269-70, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966)).
146. P. SELZNICK, supra note 34, at 134. ("In the field of employment, the con-
tract at-will brings to culmination the union of contract and the market. The contract
does not establish a relationship. From a legal point of view, the encounter is as cas-
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2. Disparity Between Contract and Relational
Expectancies
The courts will often impose extra-contractual obligations
where the contract rights and duties defined by an im-
balanced bargaining process are substantially less than the
reasonable expectations of the weaker party that arise from
the nature of the subsequent relationship. In such cases, the
duty is imposed because the contractual image of the relation-
ship composed by the stronger party simply does not reflect
the true facts of life. In such cases, "[rligid reliance upon [ad-
hesion contract] terms as defining legal obligations between
the parties, in effect, produce new forms of subservience in
the guise of contract.' 14 7
In the at-will employment relation, the almost non-exis-
tent obligations arising from the contract have little corre-
spondence to the very real expectations arising from the rela-
tionship. 14  These relational expectancies, the loss of which
are every bit as injurious as the loss of contractual expectan-
ual as the sale of a newspaper on a city street.")
147. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 2, at 1252.
148. Numerous writers have discussed the relational expectancies of employees.
Whether these interests are termed "employee equities," "valuable rights," or "new
property" their basic importance to the modern employee cannot be denied. See, e.g.,
E. GINZBERG & I. BERG, DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND THE RIGHTS OF MANAGEMENT 172-89
(1963); F. MEYERS, OWNERSHIP JOBS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 15-16 (1964); Glendon &
Lev, supra note 19, at 475-79; Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964);
Note, supra note 33, at 338-40. In the context of good faith analysis these relational
expectancies fall within those interests the court seeks to define as the "reasonable
expectations" that the law creates on behalf of a weaker party who has had no oppor-
tunity to secure his interests through effective bargaining. The most basic expecta-
tion-that the employer will not abuse the power of termination by using it for rea-
sons unrelated to the legitimate conduct of the enterprise-will be present in every
case. See note 142 supra. Other expectancies concerning retirement, pension, disabil-
ity, contingent payments, and limitations on reemployability, arising from job longev-
ity, skill specialization, damage to reputation, induced geographical immobility, and
financial and psychological interests in job security, will of course vary from case to
case. Loss of such interests should be subject to proof in each case in assessing dam-
ages. Proof of these interests should not, however, be required to establish the fact
that an injury has occurred. Injury results from breach of the proposed duty of good
faith not to use employer power for reasons unrelated to legitimate business interests.
Thus, imposing a duty of good faith does not require a showing of subjective factors
of actual dishonesty, fraud, or intent to inflict a specific harm. Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). Liability will be imposed by
reference to objective factors demonstrating the absence of any operational justifica-
tion of employer power. For a discussion of the covenant of good faith as a theory of
liability for misconduct which is neither fraudulent nor negligent see R. Summers,
supra note 136, at 199.
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cies, are left unconsidered when the courts confine themselves
to the limited contractual parameters of the at-will rule. The
gap between contract rights and the reasonable expectations
arising from the relationship creates a high potential for ex-
tensive consequential injury resulting from exercises of con-
tractual authority by the stronger party. The potential for
consequential injury has been a prominent factor in imposing
duties of good faith in insurance contracts.'4 9 In such situa-
tions, "judicial imposition of extra-contractual obligations to
protect the individual is equivalent to the imposition of a new,
legally created status in lieu of that sought to be imposed by
the dominant party."1 50 In the case of at-will employment
contracts, the imposition of extra-contractual obligations
would reestablish social control in what otherwise would be a
legally unsupervised relationship."5
3. A Necessitous Weaker Party Dependent on the
Stronger Party's Performance of a Noncommercial
Agreement
When imposing duties of good faith in insurance policies,
the courts have often noted that the insured does not seek a
commercial advantage from the contract. The parties in such
a situation are not using the contract as a mechanism for allo-
cating the business risks of an exchange in the hope of mutual
gain. Rather, the insured approaches the insurance policy
from the necessitous position of one seeking shelter from cat-
astrophic financial loss. Once the policy is acquired, the buyer
is wholly dependent upon the insurer's performance to fulfill
the expectation of coverage. The insured may pay on the pol-
icy for the balance of his life without ever needing it, but if
the need does arise, he expects and is dependent upon the in-
surer for coverage. The dependence on another for what is
considered a necessity of modern financial life prompted the
courts to impose the duty of good faith to sharply limit the
insurer's opportunities to deny obligations to its insured.
The employee is in a similar situation. The employment
contract is hardly a commercial venture. For the great majori-
tiy of Americans, employment is the only means by which the
basic necessities of life are secured. Indeed, the necessity of
149. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426
P.2d 193 (1967).
150. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 2, at 1252.
151. P. SELZNICK, supra note 34, at 134-35.
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employment far exceeds the need for insurance. Once an indi-
vidual begins work, he is dependent upon the judgment and
good will of the employer for his continued tenure and the
vitality of the enterprise. For the employee "the substance of
life is in another man's hands."'5 2
The courts often speak of the "fiduciary" nature of the
relationship that arises from these elements of necessity and
dependence in a noncommercial setting.""3 Some language in
the insurance cases suggests that duties of good faith are im-
posed because the relationship is a fiduciary one.'" The use of
the word fiduciary adds little, however, to the analysis of
those factors which prompt courts to impose tort liability for
breach of a duty of good faith because the meaning of "fiduci-
ary" is difficult to ascertain. 55 The definitions offered by the
courts are circular. One court states that a fiduciary relation-
ship may exist where "the parties are so circumstanced or as-
sociated in a business transaction that one party must rely on
the good faith and integrity of the other." ' In applying the
covenant of good faith to employment contracts, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court defined as fiduciary the duty that "neither
party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroy-
ing or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits
of the contract."' 57 This is precisely the definition of the duty
of good faith that is implied in every contract. Saying that a
relationship is fiduciary says nothing about those functional
characteristics that led the courts to define and impose a duty
of good faith. For purposes of analysis, it is best to recognize
that "fiduciary" operates in the law of good faith in the same
manner that "duty" operates in the law of negligence. Both
terms should be viewed as no more than conclusory expres-
sions of "those considerations of policy which led the law to
152. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
153. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 582, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 491, 510 P.2d 1032, 1043 (1973).
154. Id.
155. Although the courts routinely refer to the insured-insurer relationship as a
fiduciary one, some commentators describe it as "almost a fiduciary one." Note, Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,
25 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 713 (1974).
156. Stevens v. Marco, 147 Cal. App. 2d 357, 372, 305 P.2d 669, 678 (1956).
157. Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 751, 177 P.2d 931, 943 (1947) (quoting
Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167
(1933)).
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say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."'58 In
the final analysis, the relationship is fiduciary because, after
considering the characteristics of the contract, the courts are
willing to impose a duty of good faith, the breach of which
will sound in tort.
B. Application of the Proposed Duty of Good Faith
This comment contends that the characteristics of the at-
will employment contract impose on the employer a duty of
good faith not to discharge an employee for reasons unrelated
to direction of the work force in pursuit of the legitimate goals
of the enterprise. This standard would preserve the exercise of
employer disciplinary power to the extent justified by law and
policy,' while giving employees a broader protection of their
interests than is currently available under the various public
policy exceptions to the at-will rule. Imposition of the duty of
good faith is an expression of the public policy prohibiting the
use of contract law to defeat reasonable expectations arising
from certain relationships, such as employment, that are in-
fused with broad public concerns.
The standard proposed here is not without precedent. Al-
though they did not clearly define the duty being imposed,
two recent cases from the supreme courts of Massachusetts
and New Hampshire have applied the covenant of good faith
to provide a remedy to employees who would otherwise have
been unprotected under existing public policy exceptions to
the at-will rule. 160 Earlier California cases have applied the
covenant in somewhat similar circumstances.'' In each of
these cases, the courts have sought to preserve legitimate em-
ployer control while providing protection to employees who
158. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 325-26 (4th ed. 1971).
159. The proposed standard of good faith would operate in a manner similar to
the civil law concept of abuse of right. That doctrine recognizes that "a right is cre-
ated to serve a certain end or purpose, and that it cannot be exercised in an abnormal
way, i.e., in a way contrary to the economic or social purpose for which it exists."
Walton, Motive as an Element in Tort in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 22
HARV. L. REV. 501, 501 (1909).
160. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
161. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. United Aircoach, 51 Cal. 2d 199, 331 P.2d 37
(1958); Nelson v. Abraham 29 Cal. 2d 745, 177 P.2d 931 (1947); Foley v. United States
Paving Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 499, 68 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1968). See also Zimmer v. Wells
Management Corp., 348 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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would not fall within one of the public policy exceptions. A
rough outline of the scope of the protection an employee
might receive under the proposed good faith standard emerges
from these cases.
1. Securing Relational Expectancies'6 2
A strict contract approach to the at-will rule permits the
employer to induce employee tenure without incurring any
obligation to make good on his representations.' 5 The at-will
employee can accrue no contractual expectancy in employer
offers to pay seniority, pension, disability, death benefits, or
other contingent payments. The same is true of offers of bo-
nus or incentive awards subject to employer discretion,"" or
of compensation linked to a percentage of profits. 1" In each
case, a noncontractual expectancy arises which the employer
can defeat by exercising his contractual right to terminate the
employee for any reason including an intent to avoid payment
of such benefits. 66 Unless such payments were mandated by
statute, the public policy exceptions would provide no protec-
tion for these merely personal interests.
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. 767 demonstrates
the application of the duty of good faith to protect noncon-
tractual expectancies that arise from the relationship of the
parties. Fortune was employed by National Cash Register
(NCR) as a regional salesman of mercantile equipment. Al-
though terminable at will, the employment contract provided
for a fixed salary plus bonus payments computed on a per-
centage of sales in his area. Seventy-five percent of the bonus
would vest on the date of an order. The remaining twenty-five
percent would be paid if the area was still assigned to him at
the time the equipment was installed. The compensation plan
was structured to induce close cooperation between salesmen
162. See note 148 supra.
163. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
164. See Lisec v. United Airlines, 85 Cal. App. 3d 969, 149 Cal. Rptr. 847
(1978); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 349 N.E.2d 350
(1976).
165. Foley v. United States Paving, 262 Cal. App. 2d 499, 68 Cal. Rptr. 780
(1968). But see Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 177 P.2d 931 (1947).
166. Aablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959) (employee need not
return contributions to pension fund made by employee who was fired without cause
after forty-three years of service).
167. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). See also Comment, Employment
Contracts-Implied Covenant of Good Faith, 62 MAss. L.Q. 241 (1977).
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and customers. Orville Fortune did just that with a large cus-
tomer in his area, and finally secured a five million dollar or-
der on November 29, 1968. The total bonus payment due on
the sale was in excess of $92,000.00. Three days later Fortune
was fired. After making inquiry he was reinstated but not as
an area salesman. Nevertheless, he was assigned to supervise
delivery of the equipment order as an area salesman would
ordinarily do. By mid-1969, Fortune had received seventy-five
percent of the bonus due. Upon inquiry regarding the remain-
ing twenty-five percent, he was told to "forget about it." With
a son in college and retirement only four years away, Fortune
decided he could ill afford to contest NCR's action. Twelve
months later he was asked to retire. He refused and was fired
in June 1970. Fortune had worked for NCR for twenty-five
years. He sued to recover the unpaid bonus contending that
his discharges in December 1968 and June 1970 were in bad
faith. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sustained a
verdict for Fortune.
Although the court framed the issue as whether a bad
faith termination constituted a breach of the at-will contract,
it conceded that Fortune had received all the payments due
him under the express terms of the contract and that NCR
had no further liability under the contract. The court, how-
ever, held that NCR's breach of the extra-contractual cove-
nant of good faith was a breach of contract. The court de-
clined to decide whether a tort action would lie in this case,
since the parties had stipulated to a contract measure of dam-
ages. It seems likely, however, that future cases will hold that
a breach of an extra-contractual covenant sounds in tort.168
Had that been the case here, Fortune could have claimed an
expanded measure of consequential damages. For example,
bad faith termination at his age (62 years) may have effec-
tively prevented his reemployment to retirement age. Thus,
he might have recovered lost wages up to his normal retire-
ment age of 65 years.
The Fortune court did not specifically define the bad
faith involved. The court did, however, suggest that the jury
might have based its finding of bad faith on the conclusion
that NCR was motivated by desire to pay Fortune as little of
the bonus as possible. Thus, the desire to avoid payment of
168. Comment, supra note 167, at 242.
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Fortune's reasonable expectation was not within the range of
legitimate purposes for which the employer may exercise dis-
cretionary power. In this regard, the court was careful to pre-
serve the employer's interest in disciplinary power.
We do not question the general principles that an em-
ployer is entitled to be motivated by and to serve its own
legitimate business interests; that an employer must have
wide latitude in deciding whom it will employ in the face
of the uncertainties of the business world; and that an
employer needs flexibility in the face of changing circum-
stances. We recognize the employer's need for a large
amount of control over its work force .... NCR's right to
make decisions in its own interests is not, in our view, un-
duly hampered by a requirement of adherence to this
[good faith] standard.1"
2. Securing Civic Freedoms
The threat of discharge under the at-will rule often puts
the employee to a choice between maintaining his job or exer-
cising a civic freedom that the employer may wish to pro-
hibit. 17 As used here, civic freedom means the exercise of a
right or performance of a duty that a citizen might freely do
but for his status as an employee. This would include, for ex-
ample, the performance of jury duty which has been brought
within one of the public policy exceptions. The limited scope
of the public policy exceptions has failed, however, to protect
the exercise of other civic freedoms. Fortune suggests a fur-
ther extention of protection under the covenant of good faith.
a. Civil suits against an employer by an employee qua
employee. When Fortune made a request for payment of the
final twenty-five percent of the bonus, he was told to"forget
it." He had already been fired once under questionable cir-
cumstances and most likely thought little acton would be re-
quired precipitate another discharge. Given his vulnerable po-
sition, it is not surprising that he declined to press the matter.
But the result in the case indicates he had a contractual right
to the twenty-five percent payment. If Fortune had stood his
ground and insisted on complete payment, could he have re-
sorted to the courts like any other citizen for a declaration of
169. 373 Mass. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
170. The problem of collateral control of the employee beyond the workplace
has been recognized since the inception of the at-will rule. See Note, supra note 33,
at 339 n.42.
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his legal rights without thereby risking discharge?1 71 Since
Fortune's right to compensation was merely personal, the
public policy exceptions would not apply. As the result of the
case indicated, however, Fortune clearly had a reasonable ex-
pectation that was injured by employer coercion.
Under an interest balancing approach, courts must deter-
mine whether litigation of such a dispute prior to discharge
would truly interfere with the employer's legitimate control.
Legitimate control surely would not include use of coercion to
avoid payment. It seems likely that if the employer is a small
concern, the acrimony generated by litigation would interfere
with day-to-day direction of the work force. In that event dis-
charge may be justified. The employee could still litigate his
contractual right to payment after discharge, but breach of
the covenant by wrongful discharge would no longer be an
issue.
On the other hand, a similar employee suit against a large
corporate employer is unlikely to create unmanageable acri-
mony. Indeed, in such situations, disputes over company poli-
cies would likely have impact on numerous employees. The
resolution of such disputes may, in fact, aid in directing the
work force by conclusively defining the disputed rights and
obligations of the parties, thus avoiding future discord. Unless
the suit is truly frivolous the employee's access to the courts
should be protected whether or not he wins or loses.' 71
b. Civil suits against the employer by an employee act-
ing in some other capacity. In Becket v. Welton Becket &
Assocs.'7 an employee was discharged when he refused to dis-
miss a suit brought against his employer in his capacity as
171. Cf. Becket v. Welton Becket & Assocs., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr.
531 (1974) (employee acting as executor of father's estate who sued employer for ac-
counting of estate's assets has no cause of action when discharged by employer be-
cause employee refused to dismiss the suit).
172. But see Lisec v. United Airlines, 85 Cal. App. 3d 969, 149 Cal. Rptr. 847
(1978) (employees sued employer for money owed for submission of an idea pursuant
to a suggestion program on representation that employee would be paid 10% of sav-
ings achieved by use of ideas; use of idea resulted in savings in excess of $3,680,000
but employees were paid only $1,000; jury verdict of $368,000 compensatory and
$1,476,000 punitive damages reversed on appeal). Several days after the appellate de-
cision became final the employees involved were fired for their participation in the
suit. Labor Letter-Unfriendly Skies, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 5. For a
discussion of employer use and abuse of suggestion programs see Note, Rights to In-
ventions of Employees-Suggestion Boxes, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 1203 (1973).
173. 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1974).
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executor of his father's estate. The court held that the inter-
ests involved were merely personal and that the general
fiduciary duties of executors were not worthy of a public pol-
icy exception.
There is less potential for disruption of employer control
in such cases than in a suit over the terms of employment. An
executor's suit is less likely to have its origin in some personal
confrontation or dispute, since the complainant's motivation
is often more ministerial than adverserial. Moreover, such
suits have their origins in the generally recognized need to set-
tle estates. But the size of the enterprise may still influence
the impact on legitimate employer control and probably justi-
fies the result in this case. In Becket, the corporation was
closely held and the plaintiff, who had inherited a majority
share of stock in the firm, was co-executor with his brother
who was president of the firm and who opposed the suit in his
capacity as co-executor. It seems that acrimony in this situa-
tion would interfere with the effective functioning of the firm.
A contrary result would likely pertain in a large corporation.
An IBM employee holding 100 shares of IBM stock as execu-
tor of an estate is not likely to seriously threaten managerial
control by bringing a suit for an accounting or even a deriva-
tive suit for bond manipulation.
c. Exercise of rights conferred by regulatory statutes.
The West Virginia case, Harless v. First National Bank in
Fairmont,1 7 4 involved a regulatory statute which imposed du-
ties upon the employer. As discussed above, 17 5 a broad reading
of the public policy rationale will provide a cause of action to
an employee who is discharged for his efforts to secure em-
ployer compliance with such a statute. The same may not be
true, however, where the statute in question merely creates a
right in the employee which is not directly related to his sta-
tus as an employee. In such cases the policy rationale will not
protect an employee who asserts such "merely private" inter-
ests. The Oregon case of Campbell v. Ford Industries Inc.,1 7 6
offers a good example of this result.
Campbell was employed as a mechanical engineer by
Ford Industries. He also owned common stock in the corpora-
174. (W. Va. S.Ct. 1978).
175. See text accompanying notes 116-19 supra.
176. 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976). See also Campbell v. Ford Indus. Inc.,
266 Or. 479, 513 P.2d 1153 (1973).
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tion. In May 1971 Campbell made a request for information
concerning the value of his Ford Industries stock pursuant to
a state statute giving shareholders the right to inspect corpo-
rate records. He was fired on May 28, 1971 in retaliation for
his request.
Campbell filed suit alleging intentional and malicious dis-
charge and sought actual and punitive damages. He argued by
analogy to an earlier case, Nees v. Hocks,177 that an employer
may not discharge an employee where doing so would tend to
frustrate public policy. In Nees the court granted a cause of
action to an employee who was fired for accepting jury duty.
The Oregon Supreme Court, however, rejected any analogy to
Nees and denied a cause of action based on the shareholder
inspection statute.
The court reasoned that although public policy considera-
tions may be expressed by the statute, the "primary basis" for
the inspection right "is not one of public policy, but the pri-
vate and proprietary interest of stockholders. ' 178 Thus, there
was no compelling public policy basis for a cause of action in
this case. The court also attempted to distinguish Nees by ar-
guing that the conduct of refusing to request a release from
jury duty was more directly related to the employee's rights as
an employee than those exercised in'the Campbell case. This
distinction is tenuous at best. The duty to perform jury ser-
vice and the shareholder's right to inspect corporate books
arise totally independently from the employment relation. In
the former case, the employee is performing his duty as a citi-
zen. In the latter case, he is exercising his rights as a share-
holder. In neither case do the rights and duties created di-
rectly affect the employment relation, as is the case with the
workman's compensation statute. The exercise of these rights
and duties become rights of an employee qua employee only
to the extent that the courts are willing to protect their exer-
cise from employer coercion. The court has, in effect, assumed
the point in contention.
The problem in Campbell is the court's failure to ex-
amine the justifications for the employer's disciplinary action
as would occur under a good faith analysis. In discharging
Campbell, Ford Industries acted not as an employer, but as a
177. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
178. 274 Or. at 250, 546 P.2d at 145.
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stock issuer trying to prevent shareholder access to its
records. Under the terms of the disclosure statute the corpo-
ration was required, on pain of civil penalty, to respond to
shareholder inquiries made for "any proper purpose. 179 As-
suming, as the court did, that Campbell's request was proper
and not frivolous, the corporation was able to avoid its statu-
tory obligation and potential liability simply because of the
fortuity that its shareholder was also a vulnerable employee.
The courts have severely limited the stock issuer's ability to
use his employees to evade reporting responsibilities under
the securities laws 80 even where the potential for harm is re-
mote. There is little logic in permitting injury to employment
interests when the statutes providing shareholder access to
corporate records are based on many of the same concerns.
The result of the Campbell decision is that employees become
second-class shareholders at a time when employee stock own-
ership is on the rise.18' Apparently, unless a forced merger or
other stock manipulation is involved, a corporation has no le-
gitimate interest in the activities of employees in their role as
shareholders. A good faith analysis would focus on this fact
and deter coercive power in situations like Campbell.
3. Securing Individual Integrity and Personal Freedom
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.182 demonstrates the value of
focusing analysis of the at-will relation on the action of the
employer. In Monge the employee did not assert any right to
take action affecting her employer. Instead, she merely sought
to be free from employer behavior that had no legitimate rela-
tion to her supervision on the job.
Mrs. Monge worked nights in defendant's factory. After
several months she requested transfer to another machine
where she would be paid more. Her foreman suggested that
179. OR. REV. STAT. § 57.246(2).
180. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
181. O'Hara & Crawford, Will Every Corporation Have an E.S.O.P.?, 61
A.B.A.J. 1367 (1975); Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Dem-
ocratic Capitalism, 55 B.U.L. REV. 195 (1975). The court in Campbell v. Ford Indus.,
Inc., noted that "[d]ifferent considerations might be involved in a case involving the
discharge of an employee for exercising [record inspection] rights ... when that em-
ployee has acquired the stock under an employee stock ownership plan." 274 Or. at
248, 546 P.2d at 145 (1976) (footnote omitted). The court did not explain why the
means of stock acquisition should have any relevance. One must wonder, for example,
about the statutory rights of an employee who has acquired stock through a plan and
on the open market.
182. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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she could have the job if she were "nice" to him. When she
later refused to go out with him, she was moved to a lower
paying position and in other ways was harassed and ridiculed.
Several weeks later she was fired but with union help was re-
instated with a warning. Three weeks thereafter she was
found unconscious in a factory washroom and was hospital-
ized. Finally, she was fired again. During her difficulties the
plant personnel manager visited her home and acknowledged
the foreman's activities, but asked her "not to make trouble."
She sued for breach of contract and won a verdict for $2,500.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court sustained the lower
court on defendant's appeal from a denial of a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The court in Monge took the final step in the evolution of
the public policy rationale by recognizing a public policy in-
terest in balancing the relative power within the employment
relationship. "In all employment contracts, whether at-will or
for a definite term, the employer's interest in running his bus-
iness as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of
the employee in maintaining his employment, and the pub-
lic's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the
two. "183
The court injected public policy considerations into the
employment relation to impose an obligation on the employer
that "affords the employee a certain stability of employment"
while not interfering with the "employer's normal exercise of
his rights to discharge, which is necessary to permit him to
operate his business efficiently and profitably. 1 84 Thus, the
court defined the permissible scope of employer discretion in
terms of the operational requirements of the enterprise-the
"necessary" and "normal" exercise of employer power. Any
employer disciplinary action not necessary to achieve those
ends is an impermissible intrusion on public and employee in-
terests in stability of employment. Unjustified employer ac-
tion was described as "motivated by bad faith or malice or
based on retaliation"1 8 which the court held was "not in the
best interest of the economic system or the public good. 1 86
Such action constitutes a breach of contract.
183. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551 (emphasis added).
184. Id., 316 A.2d at 552 (emphasis added).
185. Id., 316 A.2d at 551.
186. Id.
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There is some confusion as to whether the cause of action
created in Monge sounds in tort or contract.187 On the one
hand, the court emphasized that the question on appeal was
whether Beebe Rubber had acted maliciously. This would in-
dicate a tort standard of liability. On the other hand, the
court stated that a termination motivated by bad faith or
malice is a breach of contract. Further support for the latter
view is found in the court's disallowance of a portion of the
verdict attributable to mental suffering. The court noted that
such damages were not generally recoverable in a contract ac-
tion. The court, however, went on to suggest that damages for
mental suffering were disallowed for lack of proof and it
would remand for new trial unless Mrs. Monge was willing to
accept the reduced verdict. This suggests that proof of mental
suffering might have been permitted on retrial.
Whatever the status of the case in New Hampshire, a
similar case would sound in tort under California's law of the
implied covenant of good faith. In California, a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith may sound in contract or tort.
Where the duty implied by the covenant is clearly extra-con-
tractual and premised on considerations of public policy as in
Monge, a breach of the covenant would constitute a tortious
breach of contract. Implying such a duty, the breach of which
sounds in tort, frees the court from the narrow constraints of
contract doctrine and permits imposition of a measure of
damages commensurate with the magnitude of harm that may
be inflicted by abuse of employer power.""
The objective in describing the above cases is not to ex-
haustively define the meaning of good faith in the context of
the employment relation. The flexibility of the good faith con-
cept and the unique qualities of each employment relation-
187. Comment, supra note 141, at 521.
188. See R. Summers, supra note 136, at 198 (footnote omitted). In the hands
of the courts, good faith is a flexible doctrine which performs the function of further-
ing the
most fundamental policy objectives of any legal system-justice, and
justice according to law. By invoking good faith . . . it may be possible
for a judge to do justice and do it according to law. Without legal re-
sources of this general nature he might, in a particular case, be unable to
do justice at all, or he might be able to do it only at the cost of fictional-
izing existing legal concepts and rules, thereby snarling up the law for
future cases. In begetting snarl, fiction may introduce inequity, unclarity
or unpredictability.
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ship make a single comprehensive definition impossible. At
best, these cases sketch a broad outline which reveals the util-
ity and adaptability of the covenant of good faith as a legal
tool to secure a diverse set of employee interests that deserve
protetion.
V. CONCLUSION
The past fifty years have witnessed the rapid develop-
ment of civil service, collective bargaining, and numerous nar-
rowly focused statutory protections that provide a portion of
the American work force with a measure of industrial justice
that is unequaled in the modern world. For these workers, a
well-developed set of procedural fairness and just cause stan-
dards exist that protect employee interests in continued em-
ployment while assuring the employer's necessary control of
the work place. In bitter contrast, an even greater number of
American workers remain subject to the at-will rule which
permits an employer to discharge an employee for any reason
whatsoever. Often harsh in its operation, the rule presents to
unscrupulous employers obvious opportunities for abuse. In
reality, the rule is a tattered remnant of nineteenth century
social and economic conceptions that have long since been put
to rest. Although its foundations have been almost completely
torn away by the passage of time and events, the at-will rule
has demonstrated a remarkable persistence in our law. This
vitality is probably due to the rule's continued usefulness in
providing employers with the control necessary to manage
their business.
The courts, however, are beginning to recognize that the
at-will rule confers on employers a degree of discretion far
greater than necessary to secure managerial control. With in-
creasing frequency the courts are "finding" exceptions to the
rule which limit its abuse. In a process familiar to the com-
mon law, these exceptions are now expanding and are replac-
ing the rule from which they evolved. From these scattered
exceptions the outlines of a cause of action for tortious dis-
charge is beginning to emerge. This comment suggests that
applying the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to em-
ployment contracts provides an ideal vehicle to complete this
evolutionary process. Application of the covenant is based on
the recognition that supposedly private conduct within the
employment relation is of general public importance and war-
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rants judicial intervention to prevent unwarranted injury to
employee interests. The proposed standard of care to be im-
posed by the covenant of good faith-that the employer limit
his use of his discharge power to situations legitimately re-
lated to the conduct of the enterprise-is itself an expression
of the increasingly recognized need to balance competing em-
ployee-employer interests. By imposing this balancing of in-
terests the courts could retain the valid exercise of employer
discretion granted under the at-will rule while protecting em-
ployees from overbearing and abusive conduct.
The long awaited rethinking of the at-will rule appears to
be at hand. It now remains for the courts to select the means
by which to accomplish the task.
Tom May

